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Testamentary Formalism in Louisiana: Curing 
Notarial Will Defects Through a Likelihood-of-Fraud 
Analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
Before James Holbrook died, he thought that his last will and 
testament was valid.1 The document that he prepared for probate 
appeared to have all of the requisite formalities for a notarial will 
required by Louisiana Civil Code article 1577.2 Unfortunately for 
Mr. Holbrook’s potential legatees, the date recorded on the 
attestation clause of the will included the year and the month, but 
not the day—contrary to the strict requirements of Louisiana law.3 
Although the will was properly dated on every other page, the 
omission of the date on the attestation clause was due to the fault 
of the notary who executed the document.4 Mr. Holbrook’s 
daughter challenged the validity of the will on the basis of its lack 
of form; she did not claim the existence of another will.5 Although 
the document complied with the statutory formalities of a notarial 
will in every other respect, a Louisiana circuit court declared his 
will null for lack of form because of a seemingly minor flaw.6  
Many people die leaving behind instruments that, although 
intended to be wills, contain errors that deviate from the statutory 
requirements. Much like the circuit court that decided Mr. 
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 1. See In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845, 848 (La. 2014).  
 2. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014): 
The notarial testament shall be prepared in writing and dated and shall be 
executed in the following manner. If the testator knows how to sign his 
name and to read and is physically able to do both, then: (1) In the 
presence of a notary and two competent witnesses, the testator shall 
declare or signify to them that the instrument is his testament and shall 
sign his name at the end of the testament and on each other separate page. 
(2) In the presence of the testator and each other, the notary and the 
witnesses shall sign the following declaration, or one substantially 
similar: “In our presence the testator has declared or signified that this 
instrument is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other 
separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we have 
hereunto subscribed our names this ____ day of _________, ____.” 
 3. Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 848. 
 4. Id. at 847–48. 
 5. Id. at 846–47. 
 6. Id. at 847. The purpose of this Comment is not to undermine the roles 
that various will formalities serve in succession law. Instead, this Comment 
presents Louisiana courts with the means to validate formally deficient wills in 
cases where the testator was properly protected against fraud or undue influence 
despite the defect. See infra Part IV.  
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Holbrook’s case, courts across the United States have historically 
regarded any deviation from the formal requirements of wills as 
fatal to a will’s validity.7 One basis for these decisions is that will 
formalities exist to provide unequivocal evidence of testamentary 
intent.8 A conflict arises, however, when the testator’s intent is 
evident despite the testator’s non-compliance with the formalities. 
In such cases, wills are often invalidated notwithstanding the clear 
intent of the testator to leave a will.9 
Fortunately, the many inequities caused by strict adherence to 
testamentary formalities have led to a reform in the law.10 Judges 
and scholars criticized the traditional approach—known as strict 
compliance—for prioritizing form over substance.11 As a result of 
this criticism, state legislatures, scholars, and courts worked to 
devise methods to protect testamentary intent without belittling the 
importance of will formalities.12 Those who advocated for reform 
offered two potential solutions: reduce the number of will 
formalities13 or replace strict compliance with a more equitable 
doctrine.14 Although reducing the number of formalities resulted in 
some success, a conflict still remained as to how courts should 
remedy the divide between testamentary intent and testamentary 
                                                                                                             
 7. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1975) (“The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and 
relentless formalism. . . . The most minute defect in formal compliance is held to 
void the will, no matter how abundant the evidence that the defect was 
inconsequential.”). 
 8. See generally id. at 492 (“When the court is asked to implement the 
testator’s intention, he ‘will inevitably be dead’ and unable to authenticate or 
clarify his declarations, which may have been made years, even decades past. 
The formalities are designed to perform functions which will assure that his 
estate really is distributed according to his intention.” (footnote omitted)). 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See generally infra Part I.B (discussing the flaws of the strict 
compliance doctrine and subsequent reform). 
 11. See generally infra Part I.B; see also Leigh A. Shipp, Comment, 
Equitable Remedies for Nonconforming Wills: New Choices for Probate Courts 
in the United States, 79 TUL. L. REV. 723, 729 (2005) (citing Stevens v. 
Casdorph, 508 S.E.2d 610, 611 (W. Va. 1998)) (“The dissent criticized the 
majority for ‘slavishly worshiping form over substance’ . . . .”).  
 12. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218 
(Supp. 2013).  
 13. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014). The notarial will is based on 
the Louisiana statutory will, which was enacted in the 1950s to create a will 
more simple in form. KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND 
DONATIONS § 12:1, in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 392 (2d ed. 2009).  
 14. See Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution, 88 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 13), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341748, archived at http://perma.cc/EN9T-NA8Z.  
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formalities.15 Thus, scholars in the last quarter of the 20th century 
attempted instead to formulate replacements for the strict 
compliance doctrine: the substantial compliance doctrine and the 
harmless error rule.16  
As opposed to strict compliance, the substantial compliance 
doctrine provides courts with a method to validate wills even if the 
document deviates from the testamentary formalities required by 
state law.17 Under substantial compliance, courts must analyze the 
formally invalid will and determine if the purpose of the formal 
requirement is adequately satisfied despite the defect.18 The 
harmless error rule presents a simplified version of substantial 
compliance: instead of performing a functional analysis, courts may 
validate a formally defective will if the document reflects the intent 
of the testator through clear and convincing evidence.19  
Unfortunately, the results under both the substantial compliance 
and harmless error doctrines have been underwhelming. Few courts 
apply these doctrines as scholars envisioned, perhaps because the 
doctrines, in some ways, present more complications than those 
presented by strict compliance.20 The analyses required of courts in 
applying the curative doctrines do not lend themselves to hard rules; 
in theory, a court applying substantial compliance or harmless error 
must do so on a contextual, case-by-case basis.21 As a result, courts 
have struggled to understand and consistently apply these 
doctrines.22 
Nowhere has this failure been more pronounced than in 
Louisiana, where the Louisiana Supreme Court purportedly 
adopted the substantial compliance doctrine in Succession of 
Guezuraga in 1987.23 In Guezuraga, the Court held that a formally 
defective will is in substantial compliance with the statutory 
requirements if the document adequately guards the testator against 
                                                                                                             
 15. See id. at 13–16.  
 16. Id.  
 17. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 513. 
 18. See generally id.  
 19. See Glover, supra note 14, at 14. Both the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Wills and Donative Transfers and the Uniform Probate Code adopted 
the harmless error rule. Id. 
 20. See Stephanie Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty 
Years Later: New Evidence for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 600–02 (2007).  
 21. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 494. 
 22. On the failures of the substantial compliance doctrine and harmless 
error rule, see infra Part I.C.2 and accompanying discussion.  
 23. See Lloyd Bonfield, Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of 
Wills: Some Guidance From the Past, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1893, 1901–02 (1996); 
Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987).  
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fraud.24 Problematically, Louisiana courts have applied Guezuraga 
inconsistently and with mixed results.25 One concern is that what 
some Louisiana courts call substantial compliance is, in 
application, more akin to a strict compliance standard;26 many of 
these courts adhere to a rule that any deviation is fatal to the 
validity of the will.27 Another issue is that some courts apply the 
Guezuraga standard inconsistently with the analysis articulated by 
the Louisiana Supreme Court.28 These approaches leave the 
validity of the document, regardless of the evidence reflecting 
testamentary intent, contingent on arbitrary decisions by each 
court. Such violations of testamentary intent are precisely the types 
of injustices that the remedial doctrines of substantial compliance 
and harmless error were designed to prevent.29 Moreover, this 
ambiguity in judicial approaches leads to conflicting decisions and 
uncertainty in the law.30  
Considering the unfeasibility of the historically recognized 
curative doctrines, this Comment advocates for Louisiana courts to 
continue to apply the doctrine propagated by Guezuraga, but 
specifically to apply the standard as articulated. To properly 
understand Guezuraga, it should be noted that the Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 24. See Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368 (citing Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note, 
Donations—Imperfect Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the 
Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L. REV. 362, 371 (1969)).  
Where the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with 
fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should not 
produce nullity. It was the intent of the legislature to reduce form to the 
minimum necessary to prevent fraud. It is submitted that in keeping 
with this intent, slight departures from form should be viewed in the 
light of their probable cause. If they indicate an increased likelihood 
that fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered 
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will. If not, they should be 
disregarded. Thus testators and estate planners will have the security 
that the legislature intended to give them. 
Id. 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial Formalism, and 
Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform Probate Code 
“Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism (pt. 1), 43 FLA. 
L. REV. 167, 239 (1991).  
 27. See, e.g., id. 
 28. See, e.g., Succession of Songne, 664 So. 2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(illustrating the use of a jurisprudential and quantitative approach, rather than a 
contextual one). 
 29. For a discussion of the remedial doctrines and their underlying 
purposes, see infra Part I.C. 
 30. For an illustration of the inconsistent standards and results reached by 
Louisiana circuit courts when analyzing formally defective wills, see infra Part 
III. 
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Supreme Court’s holding is not substantial compliance as 
understood by legal scholars.31 In Guezuraga, the Court expressed a 
completely unique doctrine that streamlines the analysis of 
validating wills that are defective in form: taking all of the formal 
shortcomings into consideration, if the document properly protects 
the testator against fraud, the will should remain valid.32 Despite this 
holding, Louisiana courts have still applied inequitable and 
inconsistent standards in determining the validity of formally 
deviant wills.33 To better enforce testamentary intent and provide 
guidance to courts, practitioners, and Louisiana citizens, this 
Comment argues that Louisiana courts should apply the Guezuraga 
test as articulated—a court should validate a will unless there is a 
likelihood of fraud or undue influence.34 Under this standard, 
courts must determine on a case-by-case, contextual basis whether 
the deviations in formality reflect the probability of fraud. This 
doctrine would provide fairness to potential legatees, while 
remaining faithful to testamentary intent. Moreover, a consistent 
standard would provide a more simplified process for courts and 
practitioners.   
Accordingly, Part I of this Comment discusses the history of 
testamentary formalism and the various remedial doctrines adopted 
by courts in the United States. Part II outlines the history of will 
formalities in Louisiana, focusing on the Louisiana Supreme 
Court’s decision in Succession of Guezuraga, which purported to 
adopt the substantial compliance doctrine. Part III then analyzes 
the Louisiana jurisprudence on substantial compliance and 
demonstrates the lack of a coherent standard. Currently, Louisiana 
courts inconsistently apply the applicable standards in examining 
formally invalid wills. Results vary from case to case, creating and 
perpetuating a lack of clarity for courts, practitioners, and testators 
alike. Finally, Part IV advocates for Louisiana courts to return to 
the Guezuraga rule. Moreover, this Part provides guidance as to 
how the rule may be applied with more consistency. Under 
Guezuraga, a testator’s intent will not be invalidated by de 
                                                                                                             
 31. See infra Part IV.A. 
 32. See Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368–69 (La. 1987). 
 33. On the inconsistent standards applied by Louisiana courts, see infra Part 
III and accompanying discussion.  
 34. This Comment does not intend to apply to testaments that contain 
defects that will, in nearly every circumstance, render the testament invalid. For 
example, a will that is not signed by the testator will almost certainly be 
invalidated under every circumstance. In theory, a major deviation in form is not 
evidence of testamentary intent because the deviation leaves the testator 
susceptible to fraud. This Comment instead addresses circumstances where the 
testator remains protected against fraud despite the deviation.  
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minimis errors, and courts are provided with a doctrine less subject 
to confusion.  
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF WILL FORMALITIES 
Most American wills statutes are based on two English 
sources: the Statute of Frauds of 1677 and the Wills Act of 1837.35 
The Statute of Frauds was remarkable because it—for the first 
time—required most testaments conveying personal property to be 
written.36 Prior to the statute’s enactment, such transfers could be 
executed orally.37 Likewise, the Wills Act was very influential 
because it merged the formal requirements for devising real and 
personal property.38 Both statutes required some combination of 
writing, signature, attestation, and the presence of witnesses.39 
These formalities, for the most part, carried over into modern 
American succession law.40  
A. The Functions of Will Formalities  
Scholars recognize four functions of testamentary formalities: 
evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, and protective.41 The evidentiary 
function reflects an understanding that statutory formalities will serve 
as “probative safeguards,”42 meaning that compliance with the 
required formalities serves as reliable evidence of testamentary 
intent.43 For example, the requirement that witnesses be present at 
the execution of the will provides courts with firsthand testimony of 
the will’s authenticity should the validity of the will be challenged.44 
                                                                                                             
 35. James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 
N.C. L. REV. 541, 547 (1990) [hereinafter Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation 
Requirement]. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 547. 
 38. Id. at 548. 
 39. Id. at 550 tbl.1. 
 40. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 212 
(Supp. 2013) (requiring that the testament must be in writing, executed or signed 
in the presence of two witnesses, and signed by the testator and both witnesses); 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014) (requiring that the testament be executed in the 
presence of a notary and two witnesses, in writing, and signed by the testator, 
notary, and both witnesses).  
 41. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725. 
 42. Langbein, supra note 7, at 492. 
 43. Id. at 492–93. 
 44. Glover, supra note 14, at 30.  
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The channeling function allows for greater judicial efficiency 
in the probate of wills.45 If all wills must meet a minimum 
formality standard, courts thereby require little “imagination” in 
determining what constitutes a valid will and what does not.46 
Again using the example of the witness requirement, a witness 
may provide unbiased testimony as to the legitimacy of the will 
execution. Each witness can attest to any formality and whether it 
was performed properly; without witness testimony, courts would 
have to rely heavily on less reliable extrinsic evidence, thereby 
slowing the judicial process.  
The cautionary function impresses upon the testator the 
seriousness of the act of executing a testament.47 Because the will 
becomes operative only upon death, formalities “caution the 
testator, and they show the court that he was cautioned.”48 The 
cautionary function also reflects the ceremonial or ritualistic nature 
of will execution.49 Requiring the presence of witnesses “sets the 
execution of a will apart from ordinary transactions.”50 The gravity 
of the execution ceremony gives the testator the opportunity to 
consider what he wants to achieve by executing the will, especially 
because the will is primarily a donative, and not onerous, act.51  
The protective function ensures “that the contents and 
execution of the will are the product of free choice of the testator, 
free of fraud or undue influence.”52 Just as the formalities protect 
the testator at the time of execution, that protection extends into 
probate.53 The challenger to a will must overcome a difficult 
presumption to prove that the “duly executed will does not 
represent a genuine expression of testamentary intent.”54 The 
advantages of having witnesses attend the execution are evident: 
the presence of multiple witnesses protects the testator not only 
from fraudulent third parties but also from a potentially fraudulent 
witness.55  
                                                                                                             
 45. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Langbein, supra note 7, at 495. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Glover, supra note 14, at 23–24.  
 50. Id. at 25. 
 51. See id.  
 52. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725.  
 53. Glover, supra note 14, at 19. 
 54. Id. at 21. 
 55. Id. at 20–21.  
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B. The Strict Compliance Doctrine 
Although formalities serve useful functions, they create 
problems in circumstances in which the intent of the testator is 
evident but the will is formally deficient. The “cornerstone of the 
law of wills” is that the testator should be given the freedom to 
dispose of his property and that the law should protect the 
“testator’s intent to exercise this freedom.”56 Will formalities thus 
present a difficult question that courts and scholars struggle to 
answer: how should a court balance the intent of the testator 
against the functions of testamentary formalities? For centuries, 
courts applied a standard of strict compliance,57 which dictates that 
any deviation from the statutory requirements, no matter how 
minor, renders the will invalid.58 The benefit of strict compliance is 
that it encourages the testator to carefully comply with statutory 
requirements.59 Moreover, a formally compliant document offers 
strong evidence of testamentary intent and thus can be routinely 
and efficiently processed by probate courts.60  
However, the results of strict compliance can be harsh for the 
potential beneficiaries of the will, especially if the document 
accurately reflects the intent of the testator but contains a merely 
technical flaw.61 Consider the Louisiana circuit court holding in In 
re Succession of Holbrook, where the testator’s will was 
invalidated by a circuit court for merely omitting the day of the 
month on the testament’s attestation clause.62 Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1577 requires that a notarial will contain a statement 
similar, but not necessarily exact, to the following: “In our 
presence the testator has declared or signified that this instrument 
is his testament and has signed it at the end and on each other 
separate page, and in the presence of the testator and each other we 
have hereunto subscribed our names this _______ day of 
_________, _____.”63 The date the will was signed was 
uncontested in the case.64  
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. at 9.  
 57. Shipp, supra note 11, at 728.  
 58. Langbein, supra note 7, at 489. 
 59. Id. at 494.  
 60. Id. See also Shipp, supra note 11, at 728 (“Conformity with statutory 
requirements presumably serves as a reliable indicator of testamentary intent.”). 
 61. Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: 
The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 453, 457 (2002). 
 62. In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845, 845 (La. 2014).  
 63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014).  
 64. See Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 847. 
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A strict reading of the statute serves little purpose other than to 
reflect a belief that compliance with the formalities is paramount to 
testamentary intent. Thus, the doctrine can be inherently unfair for 
would-be legatees. This unfairness is especially magnified under 
the rules for Louisiana notarial wills, where fault is generally 
attributed to a third party attorney or notary and not to the 
testator.65 If “[t]he first principle of the law of wills is freedom of 
testation,” strict compliance appears to foster a system that is 
inconsistent with this principle.66  
The doctrine has also proven to be less consistent in application 
than originally perceived.67 Courts will often determine that 
statutory requirements have been met in certain cases, even though 
a strict interpretation of the statute might indicate otherwise.68 For 
example, a Texas court in Nichols v. Rowan held a will to be valid 
even though one of the witnesses testified that the witnesses’ 
signatures might not have been made in the presence of the 
testator.69 The potential danger in validating such wills is that the 
deviations detract from the functions of formalities. Requiring that 
the signatures of the parties be made in the presence of each other 
is designed to protect the testator against fraudulent acts.70 
Furthermore, applying strict compliance in such a manner is 
doctrinally dishonest because the premise of strict compliance is 
that adherence to the formalities reflects testamentary intent; 
anything short of that standard, according to the doctrine, is 
                                                                                                             
 65. See infra note 150 (illustrating that the role of the notary is more 
ceremonial than practical). Louisiana does recognize a cause of action for 
would-be legatees deprived of their potential shares of the decedent’s estate due 
to the fault of an attorney or notary. See WILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, TORT LAW § 
15:27, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 374 (2d ed. 2009) (citing 
Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. Ct. App. 1971)). Liability is based on 
a stipulation pour autrui—or third party beneficiary—theory. See generally 
Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973). A full discussion of 
attorney or notary liability, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 66. Langbein, supra note 7, at 491. See also Miller, supra note 26, at 245 
(“It could be argued that the rule of strict compliance is consistent with a system 
which favors the state’s forced succession scheme, rather than a system which 
favors the ‘individualistic institution’ of private property and the principle of 
free testation.” (citations omitted)).  
 67. Sherwin, supra note 61, at 457. See also Langbein, supra note 7, at 
525–26. 
 68. Sherwin, supra note 61, at 457 (citing Cunningham v. Cunningham, 83 
N.W. 58, 60 (Minn. 1900); In re Pridgen’s Will, 107 S.E.2d 160, 163 (N.C. 
1959); Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21, 23–24 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)). See 
also Langbein, supra note 7, at 525 (“The rule of literal compliance can produce 
results so harsh that sympathetic courts incline to squirm.”). 
 69. Nichols, 422 S.W.2d at 23–24. 
 70. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725. 
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inadequate.71 Courts may be implicitly recognizing the inequities 
of strict compliance in these doctrinally suspect holdings. 
C. Attempted Reforms of Testamentary Formalism and the 
Continued Prevalence of the Strict Compliance Doctrine 
Modern legal scholars criticize strict compliance of will 
formalities on a number of grounds. Critics believe that the doctrine 
“unnecessarily values the form of a will over the substance of the 
testator’s intent”72 and argue that strict compliance is not the most 
effective means of ensuring the evidentiary, channeling, cautionary, 
and protective functions of testamentary formalities.73 If protecting 
testamentary intent is the overarching goal, strict compliance falls 
far short since a testator may still have intended for a formally 
defective will to be valid. Accordingly, scholars have proposed two 
methods of reform: the substantial compliance doctrine and the 
harmless error rule.  
1. Minimizing the Statutory Requirements for a Valid Will 
The first method of reform was to simplify the statutory 
requirements for valid wills.74 By reducing the number of 
requirements to consider a will valid, it is less likely that the 
testator’s intent will be invalidated for failing to conform to those 
requirements.75 This approach was publicized on a national scale 
through the enactment of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in 
1969, which was adopted in some form by roughly 20 states.76 
Nevertheless, even with fewer requirements, the UPC still required 
strict compliance with the listed requirements, which somewhat 
negated the effectiveness of the UPC’s reform.77 The movement 
toward simplification was also evidenced by the transformation in 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Langbein, supra note 7, at 525–26 (“Many of the formalities have 
produced a vast, contradictory, unpredictable and sometimes dishonest case law 
in which the courts purport to find literal compliance in cases which in fact 
instance defective compliance. Is a wave of the testator’s hand a publication or 
an acknowledgement? Was the signature ‘at the end’? When the attesting 
witnesses were in the next room, were they in the testator’s presence? The courts 
now purport to ask in these cases: did the particular conduct constitute literal 
compliance with the formality?” (citations omitted)). 
 72. Glover, supra note 14, at 9. 
 73. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 525–26. 
 74. Glover, supra note 14, at 12. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. See also James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 
1009, 1011 (1992). 
 77. Glover, supra note 14, at 13.  
2014] COMMENT 521 
 
 
 
individual state laws; many states have decreased the number of 
prescribed formalities in their statutory will requirements.78 In 
Louisiana, the statutory—or notarial—will was enacted to 
minimize the requisites for a valid will.79 However, although a 
reduction in the statutory requirements makes drafting a will 
simple for the testator, this method of reform still failed to provide 
courts with a framework to validate formally deficient wills.  
2. The Scholarly Attempt to Replace Strict Compliance with a 
More Equitable Doctrine  
The second method of reform, replacing strict compliance with 
a more relaxed doctrine for analyzing formal deficiencies, 
purported to provide courts with such a framework. As a result, 
many American courts adopted two doctrines in place of strict 
compliance: the substantial compliance doctrine and the harmless 
error rule.80 Both substantial compliance and harmless error 
provide courts with a process to validate wills otherwise 
considered invalid under a strict compliance standard. However, 
many states that have adopted these doctrines apply them 
sparingly, thus failing to protect testamentary intent as initially 
intended.81 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id.  
 79. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 409–10. To provide an example of an 
overly complicated will, the former Louisiana nuncupative will by public act 
required seven special formalities:  
(1) the will must be dictated by the testator to the notary in the presence 
of three witnesses residing in the place where the will is executed or of 
five witnesses not residing in the place; (2) the will must be written by 
the notary as it is dictated; (3) the will must then be read to the testator 
in the presence of the witnesses; (4) there must be no interruptions or 
turning aside to other acts; (5) the testament must be signed by the 
testator or, if he cannot sign or does not know how to write, express 
mention of this fact must be made in the will; (6) the testament must be 
signed by the witnesses, or at least by one of them for all, if the others 
cannot write; (7) express mention of the accomplishment of [the] forms 
must be made in the testament.  
LEONARD OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 103, in LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 185–86 (1973). See supra note 2 (discussing requirements 
of Louisiana notarial will, which was created to simplify the statutorily required 
will formalities); LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:4, at 427–28.  
 80. See Langbein, supra note 7; John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless 
Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in 
Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing 
Harmless Errors]. 
 81. See Lester, supra note 20, at 600–01. 
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a. The Substantial Compliance Doctrine 
In 1975, John Langbein authored Substantial Compliance with 
the Wills Act,82 which quickly became the leading authoritative 
source on the scholarly shift away from testamentary formalism 
and strict compliance.83 Langbein recognized the conflict between 
freedom of testation and the “stiff, formal requirements of the 
Wills Act.”84 Unlike other donative transferors, the testator is 
unavailable to affirm his intentions in court.85 Rather, the will is 
the only evidence of the testator’s dying wishes. Thus, according to 
Langbein, the formalities and their functions play a crucial role in 
determining testamentary intent.86 However, at times, courts’ 
insistence on adherence to formalities undercuts testamentary 
intent, especially in cases where it does not appear that the defect 
has denigrated any of the functions of formalities.87 
Langbein argued, therefore, that a defective will should be 
found in substantial compliance with the statutory requirements if 
it reflects “the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment 
of the Wills Act purposes.”88 In other words, substantial 
compliance “permits the proponents of a defective will to rebut the 
traditionally irrebuttable presumption of invalidity arising from 
defective execution by producing extrinsic evidence of the facts 
and circumstances surrounding execution” sufficient to illustrate 
satisfaction of the functions of will formalities.89 Langbein 
believed that courts had proved “competent” in determining 
whether a will adequately reflected testamentary intent and were 
“accustomed” to analyzing whether the formality functions were 
satisfied.90 He concluded that, “substantial compliance . . . merely 
extends an established judicial technique.”91 However, despite 
Langbein’s optimism, the substantial compliance doctrine gained 
little popularity among American courts.92   
                                                                                                             
 82. Langbein, supra note 7. 
 83. Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate 
Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1994).  
 84. Langbein, supra note 7, at 491–92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85. Id. at 501–02. 
 86. Id. at 492. 
 87. Id. at 498–99. 
 88. Id. at 513.  
 89. Miller, supra note 26, at 303 (citations omitted). 
 90. Langbein, supra note 7, at 516. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Bonfield, supra note 23, at 1900 (“At least in America, the widespread 
adoption by courts of substantial compliance was not to be. In a number of 
jurisdictions, courts prior to 1990 were invited to apply it, but it has been argued 
that all courts which considered the Langbein brief ultimately declined.”).  
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In its most basic form, substantial compliance allows a 
formally defective will to be probated if the deviations are found to 
be in substantial compliance with the functions of testamentary 
formalities.93 Langbein posed the question that he believed courts 
should ask: “[D]id the conduct serve the purpose of the 
formality?”94 Put another way, taking the formal deviations and 
available extrinsic evidence into consideration, did the document 
still serve the four functions of will formalities to a satisfactory 
level? However, this notion assumes that courts are familiar with 
the functions of will formalities and can properly “evaluate their 
relative significance” when resolving issues of testamentary 
intent.95 Nevertheless, courts have failed to demonstrate this 
familiarity and effectively wield substantial compliance. One 
potential cause of the doctrine’s failure is the apparent gap between 
the expectations of legal scholarship and the practicality of judicial 
application of the substantial compliance doctrine.  
Perhaps another reason for the failure of the doctrine is that 
scholars provided little guidance to courts as to how the substantial 
compliance doctrine should be applied. Twelve years after the 
publication of Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 
Langbein wrote that only one court had utilized the doctrine 
appropriately.96 The case was Estate of Joseph Kajut, from the 
Court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania.97 The court held that 
although the testator’s name had been typed on the will prior to 
execution, rather than handwritten by the testator at the time of 
execution, the will remained valid. The court conducted an 
“exploration of the purposes” of will statutes and determined that 
the intent of the testator was evident and that “no useful purpose” 
would be served by invalidating the will “by a technical adherence 
to the [statute].”98 The principal purpose of the will statute, 
according to the court, “is to make certain that the intent of a 
testator is effectuated.”99 Although Langbein praised this case, it is 
worth noting that the case is strikingly lacking in the breadth of the 
court’s analysis regarding the will’s validity.   
Another possible explanation for the lack of popularity can be 
found in the name of the doctrine itself.100 One scholar, C. Douglas 
                                                                                                             
 93. Lester, supra note 20, at 579–80. 
 94. Langbein, supra note 7, at 526. 
 95. Miller, supra note 26, at 304. 
 96. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80, at 8.  
 97. Id. (citing Estate of Joseph Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 123 (Pa. C.P. 
1981)).  
 98. Estate of Joseph Kajut, 22 Pa. D. & C.3d at 136. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Miller, supra note 26, at 306–08. 
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Miller, argued that “‘[s]ubstantial compliance’ implies a 
quantitative or yardstick standard of compliance which if not 
achieved is not ‘substantial.’”101 According to Miller, courts 
applied the doctrine using a quantitative analysis, analyzing the 
“size” of each defect as opposed to analyzing the whole document 
against the testamentary functions.102 In other words, some courts’ 
interpretation of substantial compliance is that the document 
cannot substantially comply with the statutory formalities unless 
the deviation is minimal.103 Like Langbein, Miller believed that 
most courts purporting to use substantial compliance were using a 
different analysis altogether.104 Miller suggested that “functional 
compliance” would be a less misleading title to courts than 
“substantial compliance.”105  
Moreover, the substantial compliance doctrine, as applied, is 
somewhat at odds with itself. The doctrine purports to protect the 
formality functions of will execution, but does so at the expense of 
one of those functions: channeling.106 Substantial compliance 
inherently presents courts with a greater challenge in analyzing 
formally invalid wills. The reasoning behind the channeling 
function is that the presence of formalities provides courts with 
clear evidence of testamentary intent such that they can rubber 
stamp a will as valid or invalid simply by comparing the document 
to the statutory requirements.107 By adopting a rule that not all 
formalities must be followed strictly, the courts are left to make the 
difficult determination of whether the functions have been 
substantially satisfied.  
This internal conflict additionally presents a circular problem. 
Without court consistency in articulating minimum criteria, the 
evidentiary value of the document diminishes as well. If the 
probate of a will lacking in form is contingent upon a court’s 
determination of compliance with the functions of formalities, then 
the evidentiary function of those formalities is undermined. Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 307. 
 102. Id. Miller’s hypothesis is derived from an analysis of Australian courts 
and at least one court in the United States. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 308. 
 105. Id. at 307.  
 106. Langbein acknowledged that the success of the doctrine depended on 
whether or not it would provide clarity to the law or further confuse the courts. 
See Langbein, supra note 7, at 523–24. Langbein personally thought that 
substantial compliance would apply overwhelmingly to handwritten wills 
because they constituted the majority of wills executed without counsel. Id.  
 107. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725–26.  
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the success of the doctrine remains somewhat contingent upon 
whether its application is consistent.  
b. The Harmless Error Rule 
Langbein, perhaps out of frustration due to the lack of success 
of the substantial compliance doctrine, modified his position in 
1987.108 Langbein admitted the flaws of substantial compliance 
and instead advocated for the second of the curative doctrines, a 
“harmless error” rule.109 Like the substantial compliance doctrine, 
harmless error is designed to be a purposive, non-technical 
approach.110 However, instead of determining whether the 
document complies with each of the functions of testamentary 
formalism, the court must determine whether the document is an 
accurate reflection of testamentary intent.111 Harmless error does 
not require a quantitative analysis: “A judge using the harmless 
error rule may examine both the noncomplying document as a 
whole and the circumstances surrounding the document’s 
execution.”112 Harmless error comes with a higher standard of 
proof: the document must demonstrate through clear and 
convincing evidence that the testator intended the document to be 
his will.113 Also, unlike the judicially adopted doctrine of 
substantial compliance, harmless error is generally promulgated 
through legislation.114  
Undoubtedly persuaded by Langbein and the success of the 
doctrine in foreign jurisdictions, the drafters of the Uniform 
Probate Code adopted the harmless error rule in their 1990 
revisions.115 The UPC adopted Langbein’s definition almost 
verbatim: a formally defective document will be treated as 
statutorily compliant “if the proponent of the document establishes 
                                                                                                             
 108. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80. Langbein admitted 
the “snail’s pace of progress” of non-statutory substantial compliance in United 
States courts. Id. at 8–9. Moreover, Langbein determined that substantial 
compliance was a “flop” in application in Australian courts. In Langbein’s view, 
the courts read “substantial” to mean “near perfect,” invalidating wills that 
suffered from minor formal deviations. Id. at 1.  
 109. Id. Langbein adopted the doctrine from the South Australian 
“dispensing power.” Id. 
 110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
3.3 cmt. b (1998).  
 111. Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement, supra note 35, at 568. 
 112. Lester, supra note 20, at 580.  
 113. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 80, at 53. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Shipp, supra note 11, at 727; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 editors’ 
cmt. (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218 (Supp. 2013). 
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with clear and convincing evidence” that the testator “intended the 
document . . . to constitute” his will.116 Likewise, the Restatement 
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers endorses 
the harmless error rule.117 The Restatement provides further 
guidance on the application of the doctrine, explaining that each 
error should be analyzed “in relation to the purpose of the statutory 
formalities, not in relation to each individual statutory formality 
scrutinized in isolation.”118 According to the comments to the 
Restatement, analyzing the formalities in isolation would require a 
“technical” and “non-purposive” analysis.119  
Although harmless error is perhaps accepted more favorably 
than substantial compliance, as evidenced by the Restatement and 
the Uniform Probate Code’s adoption of the rule, only ten states 
have enacted some form of the harmless error provision of the 
Uniform Probate Code.120 Within these states, even fewer courts 
have actually applied harmless error in cases involving facially 
defective wills.121 The reasoning behind the doctrine’s failure 
remains somewhat unclear. Perhaps, like substantial compliance, 
intent is not a clearly defined concept, and both scholars and courts 
have provided too little guidance on how the doctrine should be 
appropriately applied. Even with the failure of the harmless error 
doctrine, very few courts use substantial compliance in practice.122 
By mostly rejecting the substantial compliance doctrine and the 
harmless error rule, courts are perhaps implicitly recognizing the 
                                                                                                             
 116. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 218 (Supp. 
2013). 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 3.3 (1998).  
 118. Id. § 3.3 cmt. b (1998).  
 119. Id.  
 120. Those states are: California, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, Montana, 
New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia. Glover, supra note 14, at 
15 n.105. See also In re Will of Palecki, 920 A.2d 413, 426–27 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(“In this regard, it is notable that New Jersey was hardly part of a state law 
stampede when it recently revised its law to eliminate a strict signature 
requirement. Although there has been scholarly support for changes of the kind 
New Jersey made for some time and even though the UPC was itself amended in 
1990 to provide for a harmless error provision analogous to that which New 
Jersey later adopted, only a very few states have adopted that model rule.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 121. Lester, supra note 20, at 600.  
 122. Id. at 602. Texas has adopted a narrow form of substantial compliance 
by statute. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 251.101 (West 2014). Lester also 
mentions one case from New Jersey, In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 
1991), decided prior to the adoption of the harmless error rule in 2004 that is the 
“most widely cited example of substantial compliance.” Lester, supra note 20, at 
601.  
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necessity for a new approach to validating formally defective wills. 
Thus, considering the current lack of acceptance of the curative 
doctrines, “strict compliance clearly continues to dominate United 
States policy.”123  
II. LOUISIANA AND THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE 
Louisiana courts have historically applied strict compliance 
when analyzing formally defective wills.124 Over time, however, 
both the Louisiana Legislature and Louisiana courts have recognized 
the overwhelming support for adopting a relaxed approach towards 
will formalities.125 The Legislature modernized the forms of 
testaments by enacting the statutory will, a form of wills derived 
from the common law with minimal formalities.126 The statutory 
will evolved into the notarial will, which is currently described in 
Civil Code article 1577.127 The movement away from stringent 
formality reached its pinnacle when the Louisiana Supreme Court 
decided Succession of Guezuraga, where the Court purported to 
adopt the substantial compliance doctrine.128 
A. The Evolution from Strict Compliance to Relaxation of 
Formalities 
In Louisiana, the traditional judicial understanding was that 
even if a document evidenced testamentary intent, deviation from 
the statutory formalities was fatal to the will.129 As it was in the 
rest of the United States, this understanding was based on the 
concept of strict compliance—that statutory formalities serve as 
evidence of testamentary intent.130 In 1938, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court held in Soileau v. Ortego that “the intention to make a will, 
                                                                                                             
 123. Lester, supra note 20, at 602.  
 124. See, e.g., Soileau v. Ortego, 180 So. 496, 497 (La. 1938).  
 125. The Legislature adopted the notarial will to simplify the formal 
requirements for wills. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014). Additionally, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court purported to adopt the substantial compliance 
doctrine. See Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987). 
 126. See LORIO, supra note 13. 
 127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 cmt. a (2014). 
 128. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368.  
 129. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393–94. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 
1573 (2014) (“The formalities prescribed for the execution of a testament must 
be observed or the testament is absolutely null.”); OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, § 
101, at 184–85 (“No matter how well the substantive provisions of the testament 
effectuate his client’s wishes, if the attorney does not draft his testament 
carefully and execute it correctly, his work will be in vain.”). 
 130. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393–94. 
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although clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the 
execution thereof complies with the statutory requirements.”131 
The Court further provided that the purpose of formalities is to 
“guard against and prevent mistake, imposition, undue influence, 
fraud, or deception, to afford means of determining . . . 
authenticity, and to prevent the substitution of some other writing 
in place thereof.”132 According to the Court, even if “there is no 
fraud, or even [a] suggestion or imitation of it, [courts are not 
justified] in departing from the statutory requirements, even to 
bring about justice . . . since any material relaxation in the statutory 
rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and 
imposition.”133 Nevertheless, scholars also maintain that the 
traditional “cardinal rule” when interpreting testaments in 
Louisiana is to uphold the intent of the testator.134 Keeping this 
cardinal rule in mind, “proof of non-compliance must be 
‘particularly strong’ to overcome the presumption of validity 
associated with testaments.”135  
Modern Louisiana law reflects a shift away from testamentary 
formalism in a manner similar to movements in the common law. 
Like the revision of the Uniform Probate Code in 1969, Louisiana 
took steps to simplify the will-making process.136 The Louisiana Civil 
Code of 1870 provided four forms of testaments:137 nuncupative by 
public act,138 nuncupative by private act,139 mystic,140 and 
                                                                                                             
 131. Soileau v. Ortego, 180 So. 496, 497 (La. 1938).  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 393. 
 135. Id. at 394.  
 136. On the various approaches of reform to curing invalid testaments, see 
supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion. 
 137. LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:1, at 392. 
 138. For a discussion of the requirements of the nuncupative will by public 
act, see supra note 79.  
 139. “The nuncupative will by private act must be written either by the 
testator or by another person from the testator’s dictation in the presence of five 
witnesses who reside in the place where the will is made or of seven who reside 
outside that place.” OPPENHEIM, supra note 79, § 105, at 191. Moreover, “the 
testator must either read his will to the assembled witnesses or cause it to be 
read to the witnesses in his presence.” Id. § 105, at 192. Then, the testator must 
sign the will if capable. Id. § 105, at 192. 
 140. The requirements for the mystic will were as follows: 
[T]he testator must sign his dispositions, whether he wrote them 
himself or caused them to be written by another person at his direction. 
The document must then be closed and sealed. The testator must then 
present the will, closed and sealed, to the notary and three witnesses or 
close it and seal it in their presence, and must declare to the notary, in 
the presence of the witnesses, that the document contains his testament 
written by himself or by another at his direction and is signed by him. 
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olographic.141 In 1952, Louisiana adopted the statutory will directly 
from common law sources to provide an “efficient, simpler 
alternative” to the four separate forms of wills provided in the 
Civil Code.142 Moreover, in the 1997 revision of successions law in 
the Civil Code, all but two forms of testaments were discarded: the 
olographic143 and the notarial wills.144  
The notarial will, described in Civil Code article 1577, is a 
codified version of the common law statutory will.145 However, 
many of the formalities within the Code article itself derive from 
the civil law.146 The article provides that the testament must be in 
writing.147 Additionally, the testator must, in the presence of a 
                                                                                                             
 
The notary must then draw up an act of superscription which must be 
written on the document itself or upon the envelope which contains it and 
the superscription must be signed by the testator, the notary, and the 
witnesses. All the formalities must be performed without interruption or 
turning aside to other acts. Since the testator must sign the will and the 
superscription, those who do not know how to write or are not able to 
write cannot make dispositions in the form of a mystic will. The act of 
superscription must be signed by at least two of the witnesses and if any 
of the witnesses cannot write, express mention of that fact must be made 
in the act itself . . . [I]t is essential that the act of superscription recite that 
all the formalities have been complied with or the will is null. 
Id. § 107, at 195–96.  
 141. Article 1575 of the Louisiana Civil Code currently prescribes the 
requirements for the olographic will:  
An olographic testament is one entirely written, dated, and signed in the 
handwriting of the testator. Although the date may appear anywhere in 
the testament, the testator must sign the testament at the end of the 
testament. If anything is written by the testator after his signature, the 
testament shall not be invalid and such writing may be considered by the 
court, in its discretion, as part of the testament. The olographic testament 
is subject to no other requirement as to form. The date is sufficiently 
indicated if the day, month, and year are reasonably ascertainable from 
information in the testament, as clarified by extrinsic evidence, if 
necessary. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1575(A) (2014).  
 142. Id.  
 143. This Comment does not focus on the applicability of the curative 
doctrines to the olographic will due to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s limitation 
of Succession of Guezuraga to the notarial will. A discussion on the olographic 
will is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 144. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1576 (2014).  
 145. See LORIO, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 409–10; see also LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1577 cmt. a (2014) (explaining that the notarial will is equivalent to the 
statutory will under former Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:2442).  
 146. See RONALD J. SCALISE JR., Testamentary Formalities in the United States 
of America, in COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW VOLUME 1: TESTAMENTARY 
FORMALITIES 369 (Kenneth G. C. Reid et al. eds., 2011).  
 147. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1577 (2014). 
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notary and two witnesses, declare that the document is intended to 
be his testament and sign his name at the end of the document and 
on each page.148 Finally, the notary and the witnesses must sign 
and date an attestation clause in the presence of the testator and 
each other.149 The Louisiana notarial will is unique from other will 
execution statutes in the United States in that it is the only statute 
that requires the will to be notarized.150 Louisiana is also one of the 
few states that requires the testator to sign each page of the will.151 
B. Succession of Guezuraga 
In 1987, the Louisiana Supreme Court established the current 
formulation of the applicable doctrine of will formalities in 
Succession of Guezuraga.152 Reasoning that the Louisiana 
Legislature adopted the statutory will from the common law in order 
to lessen the strict will formalities, the Court noted that it was “not 
required to give the statutory will a strict interpretation.”153 The 
Court further held that a will should be upheld “as long as it is in 
substantial compliance with the statute.”154 Interestingly, the Court 
remarked that when determining what constitutes substantial 
compliance, courts should look to only one purpose of the formal 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. 
 150. See SCALISE JR., supra note 146, at 369 n.103. The lessened role of the 
notary may also contribute to the shift from formalism in Louisiana as applied to 
notarial wills. In other civil law jurisdictions, such as France, the notary is an 
officer of the court and performs duties unique from those of an attorney. SAUL 
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 12:15, in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 296–97 
(2d ed. 2001). In colonial Louisiana, the notary played a pronounced role 
equivalent to that of other civilian jurisdictions. Id. § 12:15, at 297. However, 
over time, the importance of the Louisiana notary diminished. The common law 
equivalent of the notary, the attorney, now performs many of the notarial duties 
in Louisiana. Id. Furthermore, even non-attorneys are capable of becoming 
notaries. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35:191(A) (2006) (the requisites for 
achieving notary status include a high school diploma and being mentally 
sound). Thus, the requirement of the presence of the notary in article 1577 
appears more ceremonial than practical.  
 151. See SCALISE JR., supra note 146, at 364 n.62.  
 152. 512 So. 2d 366 (La. 1987). The Louisiana Supreme Court used the 
phrase “substantial compliance” prior to Guezuraga in Succession of Porche, 
288 So. 2d 27, 29 (La. 1973) (“We agree with the intermediate court that the 
present will substantially complies with the statutory formalities required and is 
therefore valid.”). However, because Porche was decided prior to Langbein’s 
article—which provides the clearest articulation of the doctrine—and because 
Guezuraga provides the standard currently recognized by most Louisiana courts, 
this Comment focuses on Guezuraga and its progeny.  
 153. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368. 
 154. Id. 
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requirements: namely, “to guard against fraud.”155 In other words, 
if the deviation from the will formalities does not expose the 
testator to fraud, “ordinary common sense dictates that such 
departure should not produce nullity.”156 Conversely, if the defect 
“indicate[s] an increased likelihood that fraud may have been 
perpetrated [the defect] would be considered substantial and thus a 
cause to nullify the will.”157  
The Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed Guezuraga in 2014 
in In re Succession of Holbrook.158 In Holbrook, the Court 
overturned the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment 
in favor of the party challenging the will’s validity.159 The Court 
held that it “need not strictly adhere to the formal requirements of 
the statutory will, to the extent of elevating form over function.”160 
Quoting Guezuraga, the Court confirmed that the underlying goal 
is to “guard [the testator] against fraud” and that the proper 
analysis is to determine whether the lack of formal compliance 
“indicate[s] an increased likelihood that fraud may have been 
perpetrated.”161 
The Court’s approach in both Guezuraga and Holbrook is 
significant in its uniqueness. Although the Court is correct in 
stating that courts should look to the purposes of formality when 
applying substantial compliance,162 avoidance of fraud is but one 
of these functions.163 Therefore, the Louisiana approach represents 
a truncated interpretation of substantial compliance. Regrettably, 
                                                                                                             
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (quoting Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note, Donations—Imperfect 
Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L. 
REV. 362, 371 (1969)). The Court’s entire analysis is as follows: 
Where the departure from form has nothing whatsoever to do with 
fraud, ordinary common sense dictates that such departure should not 
produce nullity. It was the intent of the legislature to reduce form to the 
minimum necessary to prevent fraud. It is submitted that in keeping 
with this intent, slight departures from form should be viewed in the 
light of their probable cause. If they indicate an increased likelihood 
that fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered 
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will. If not, they should be 
disregarded. Thus testators and estate planners will have the security 
that the legislature intended to give them. 
Id.  
 157. Id. 
 158. See In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014). 
 159. Id. at 847.  
 160. Id. at 851.  
 161. Id.  
 162. See Lester, supra note 20, at 578–79. 
 163. The protective function is meant to ensure that the document is free 
from fraud or undue influence. See Shipp, supra note 11, at 725. 
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the resulting applications by Louisiana lower courts have been 
extremely inconsistent.  
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED BY 
LOUISIANA COURTS 
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
substantial compliance doctrine in Guezuraga, Louisiana circuit 
courts have applied a wide variety of standards when analyzing the 
formal validity of wills. Many courts follow Guezuraga to varying 
degrees, whereas some courts apply a different standard altogether.164 
Furthermore, the holdings of some cases indicate that, regardless of 
the doctrine that courts purport to apply, strict compliance is the 
actual standard employed.165 By relying strictly on rules created by 
precedent or applying language like “material deviation,” the 
implication is that courts are applying a quantitative standard and 
disregarding contextual evidence of testamentary intent. 166 
A. The Inconsistent Standards Applied by Louisiana Courts 
When analyzing formally defective wills, some courts follow the 
Guezuraga rule and analyze the statutory deviations against fraud in 
order to determine whether the substantial compliance standard is 
satisfied.167 The Second Circuit provided perhaps the best 
articulation of the Guezuraga standard in Succession of Bilyeu.168 
The court held that “when the instrument shows that the formalities 
have been satisfied, technical deviations in the attestation clause 
should not defeat the dispositive portions of an otherwise valid 
will.”169 Consequently, “[i]f there exists an indication of the 
increased likelihood of fraud, the variations would be considered 
substantial and thus a cause to nullify a will. If not, they should be 
disregarded.”170 Outside of Bilyeu, other courts merely cite the 
                                                                                                             
 164. See infra Part III.A. 
 165. See, e.g., In re Succession of Dunaway, 92 So. 3d 555, 557–58 (La. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 166. See, e.g., In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1188 (La. Ct. 
App. 2013), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).  
 167. See, e.g., Successions of Eddy, 664 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“A liberal construction of the statutory will law requires us to maintain the 
validity of a will as long as it is in substantial compliance with the statute. In 
deciding what constitutes substantial compliance, we must look to the purpose 
of the formal requirements—to guard against fraud.” (citation omitted)). 
 168. Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. Ct. App. 1996). In Bilyeu, 
the attestation clause referred to the male testator as “she” and “her.” Id. at 58. 
 169. Id. at 59.  
 170. Id. The court ultimately upheld the validity of the will. Id.  
2014] COMMENT 533 
 
 
 
language verbatim or nearly identical language from Guezuraga 
instead of providing their own interpretation of the Guezuraga 
doctrine.171 
However, other courts claim to use substantial compliance—or 
some other form of relaxed standard—without mentioning either 
the formality functions or fraud.172 The result is some hybrid 
standard between Guezuraga and strict compliance. In In re 
Succession of Richardson, for example, the First Circuit provided a 
discussion on the policy behind the statutory will similar to the 
Guezuraga Court’s discussion.173 The court stated, in analyzing the 
attestation clause requirement, “we will not require strict, technical, 
and pedantic compliance in form or language.”174 The court 
followed this seemingly relaxed standard by iterating that “all of the 
formal requisites for confection of a notarial testament must be 
observed, under penalty of nullity.”175 Such language is more 
indicative of strict compliance. Ultimately, the court in Richardson 
held that the defect was not in “substantial compliance” with the 
statutory requirements.176 Nevertheless, the court failed to cite 
language concerning protection of the testator against fraud when 
considering the validity of the will.177 
Additionally, many cases make no mention of Guezuraga or 
substantial compliance at all and apply a standard more suggestive 
of strict compliance.178 For example, the court in In re Hendricks 
                                                                                                             
 171. See, e.g., Succession of Hogan, 666 So. 2d 684, 685 (La. Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Guezuraga directly); Succession of Squires, 640 So. 2d 813, 814–15 
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Guezuraga directly). 
 172. See, e.g., In re Succession of Sampognaro, 865 So. 2d 307, 309 (La. Ct. 
App. 2004) (“[T]he Louisiana Supreme Court observed that in accordance with 
the legislative intent, courts liberally construed and applied the statutory will 
statute, maintaining the validity of a will if at all possible, as long as the will was 
in substantial compliance with the statute.”); In re Succession of Richardson, 
934 So. 2d 749, 750 (La. Ct. App. 2006).  
 173. Richardson, 934 So. 2d at 751. In Richardson, the will did not contain 
an attestation clause. Id.  
 174. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. See id. The court held that the absence of the attestation clause was fatal 
to the will’s validity. Id.  
 178. See In re Succession of Dunaway, 92 So. 3d 555, 557–58 (La. Ct. App. 
2012) (“Moreover, although the intention of the testator as expressed in the 
testament must govern, the intent to make a testament, although clearly stated or 
proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof complies with codal 
requirements. A material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed by 
the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament. The formalities prescribed 
for the execution of a testament must be observed or the testament is absolutely 
null.” (citations omitted)); In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1188 
(La. Ct. App. 2013) (“Moreover, although the intention of the testator as 
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provided that a testament is “ineffectual unless the execution thereof 
complies with the codal requirements.”179 The court further stated 
that a “material deviation from the manner of execution prescribed 
by the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament.”180 Not 
surprisingly, other courts often cite similar language in cases where 
the court chooses to invalidate the testament.181 What most of these 
cases have in common is the lack of language regarding upholding 
testamentary intent, a fundamental principle underlying Louisiana 
succession law.  
B. “Substantially Strict” Compliance 
As a result, these patchwork analyses often force courts to 
conduct the very types of quantitative analyses against which 
Langbein advocated.182 For example, in Succession of Songne, the 
testator included different years in the dates on different pages of 
the document.183 Without citing any doctrinal standard such as 
Guezuraga, the court in Songne merely cited to a rule, established 
by precedent, that a will containing two different dates “is not 
stricken with invalidity.”184 Applying this rule, the Songne court 
upheld the validity of the will.185 The court accepted the testimony 
of the notary and the witnesses not to determine the will’s validity 
but to determine the correct date.186  
Similarly, when In re Succession of Holbrook was before the 
First Circuit, Mr. Holbrook’s widow attempted to use Songne as 
dispositive precedent governing the challenge to her husband’s 
                                                                                                             
 
expressed in the testament must govern, the intent to make a testament, although 
clearly stated or proved, will be ineffectual unless the execution thereof 
complies with codal requirements. A material deviation from the manner of 
execution prescribed by the code will be fatal to the validity of the testament.” 
(citations omitted)), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014).  
 179. In re Hendricks, 28 So. 3d 1057, 1060 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
 180. Id.  
 181. See, e.g., In re Succession of Wade, No. 2012-CA-0808, 2012 WL 
6681706 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2012) (invalidating will because testator did not 
sign the document); In re Succession of Seal, No. 2010-CA-0351, 2010 WL 
3527597 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2010) (invalidating will because notary and 
witnesses failed to sign an adequate attestation clause); Hendricks, 28 So. 3d at 
1057 (invalidating will because testator failed to sign one of the dispositive 
provisions of the will).  
 182. See Langbein, supra note 7. 
 183. See Succession of Songne, 664 So. 2d 556, 558 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 558–59 
 186. See id. at 558. 
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will.187 After all, the differences were minor: in Songne, the years 
on the document were different and in Mr. Holbrook’s will, the 
day of the month was merely omitted from the attestation clause.188 
The court also acknowledged that “the intention of the testator as 
expressed in the testament must govern.”189 However, the First 
Circuit found Mr. Holbrook’s will to be invalid.190 In making this 
determination, the court cited language stating that a “material 
deviation” from statutory formalities renders the will invalid.191 
Similar to the Songne court’s reasoning, the First Circuit’s holding 
was based almost exclusively on rules established by precedent; 
not once did it mention substantial compliance or protecting the 
testator from fraud.192 The court also distinguished the facts of the 
case from Songne, even though the differences were relatively 
insignificant.193 Moreover, the court neglected to consider the 
testimony of the notary and one of the witnesses in support of the 
will’s validity.194  
Cases like Songne and Holbrook illustrate both the lack of a 
coherent standard and the potentially inequitable results produced 
by this doctrinal void. Although the Songne court upheld the will, a 
blanket rule that all wills that contain two different dates should be 
considered valid misconstrues the purpose of the curative 
doctrines. Substantial compliance requires a functional analysis.195 
Therefore, precedent should be mostly irrelevant because each 
defect should be analyzed in light of the circumstances surrounding 
the execution.196 In theory, the curative doctrines require a 
                                                                                                             
 187. In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1189 (La. Ct. App. 
2013), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014). While the lower court’s holding was 
overturned by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the lower court’s analysis is still 
relevant. The Louisiana Supreme Court merely overturned the lower court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the party opposing the will; the 
case was not decided on its merits. Holbrook, 144 So. 3d at 845. Moreover, the 
lower court’s analysis illustrates that some courts still prefer to use a stricter 
compliance standard. 
 188. Holbrook, 115 So. 3d at 1185.  
 189. Id. at 1188.  
 190. Id. at 1189.  
 191. Id. at 1188.  
 192. Id. at 1185–90. 
 193. Id. at 1189.  
 194. Id.  
 195. For a discussion of the substantial compliance doctrine and its proper 
analysis, see supra Part I.C. 
 196. See Miller, supra note 26, at 303–04 (“Langbein characterizes substantial 
compliance as essentially a litigation doctrine that permits the proponents of a 
defective will to rebut the traditionally irrebuttable presumption of invalidity 
arising from defective execution by producing extrinsic evidence of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding execution sufficient to prove testamentary intent by a 
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contextual determination, considering both the testament and the 
available extrinsic evidence, of whether the document adequately 
serves the formality functions or represents an accurate reflection of 
testamentary intent.197 Subscribing to precedential rules indicates 
that the analysis is quantitative. In other words, courts believe that 
certain defects always “substantially comply” with the will statute 
and others do not.  
Conversely, the lower court’s analysis in Holbrook bypasses 
Guezuraga altogether, providing evidence that many courts prefer 
utilizing stricter criteria when analyzing formally defective wills. 
Such courts may implicitly be recognizing the perceived 
shortcomings of the curative doctrines. Accordingly, there is not 
only jurisprudential confusion as to the proper standard, but there is 
also jurisprudential ambiguity as to what constitutes a formally 
compliant will and what does not. The result appears to be that strict 
compliance maintains a prevalent role in Louisiana law.  
IV. THE GUEZURAGA TEST AS A UNIQUE CURATIVE APPROACH 
Louisiana courts are left with few practical or desirable 
solutions to cure the current ambiguity. The overwhelming 
academic and jurisprudential sentiment indicates that the inequities 
of strict compliance are unsustainable in modern succession law. 
Although both substantial compliance and harmless error, when 
applied according to the scholarly articulation, may potentially 
achieve a more equitable result than strict compliance, neither has 
had much success as applied in other states.198 Thus, neither 
substantial compliance nor harmless error presents an ideal solution. 
Consequently, this Comment argues for a continuing application of 
the Guezuraga standard, supplying Louisiana courts with a curative 
doctrine uniquely distinct from those applied in other jurisdictions. 
Moreover, this Comment provides guidance as to the proper 
application of this standard. 
                                                                                                             
 
preponderance of the evidence. In contrast to the quantitative or sufficiency notion 
of substantial compliance sometimes applied in the courts, application of the 
functional substantial compliance doctrine does not depend on the court's 
determining that the conduct of the testator or witnesses was sufficiently close to 
the statutory standard to be deemed in actual compliance with the wills act.”).  
 197. Id. at 302–11. 
 198. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the lack of success of the curative 
doctrines).  
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A. The Guezuraga Test 
In light of the limitations of the historical approaches, this 
Comment advocates for courts to maintain the Guezuraga 
standard: if the formalities present in a document, taking all formal 
deviations into consideration, sufficiently protect the testator 
against the probability of fraud, the will remains valid.199 Like the 
underlying purposes of substantial compliance, the functions of 
testamentary formalities remain properly preserved under this 
doctrine. However, the Guezuraga standard is distinct from the 
substantial compliance doctrine as understood by Langbein.200 
Perhaps one source of confusion in Louisiana is that referring to 
Guezuraga as a substantial compliance case is a misnomer. First, 
the scholarly understanding of substantial compliance is that courts 
must apply a functional analysis.201 Guezuraga, on the other hand, 
requires courts to look only to the likelihood of fraud, taking into 
account only one of the functions of statutory formalities: the 
protective function.202 Second, the name substantial compliance 
leads courts to believe that the doctrine requires a quantitative, as 
opposed to a contextual, analysis.203 Thus, this Comment rejects 
the continued use of referring to the Guezuraga standard as 
“substantial compliance” and chooses instead to refer to the 
standard simply as the “Guezuraga test.”  
The Guezuraga test, as articulated, essentially serves a similar 
role as the harmless error rule by providing a simplified version of 
substantial compliance. The goal of the Guezuraga test—to guard 
against fraud—provides the same function as that underlying 
harmless error: the protection of testamentary intent. Of the four 
functions of testamentary formalities, the protective function is the 
function most directly tied to testamentary intent. In other words, 
evidence of fraud or undue influence indicates that the testator did 
not truly intend for the document to be his or her will. The test’s 
advantage over harmless error is that its analysis is more targeted 
                                                                                                             
 199. Succession of Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. 1987). 
 200. Langbein believed that every function of will formalities should be 
considered when analyzing defective wills. Langbein, supra note 7, at 513 (“The 
substantial compliance doctrine would permit the proponents in cases of 
defective execution to prove what they are now entitled to presume from due 
execution—the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment of the 
[statutory functions].”). Guezuraga provides that wills should be validated only 
after analyzing the defect against the protective function. See Guezuraga, 512 
So. 2d at 368.  
 201. See generally Langbein, supra note 7, at 523. 
 202. See Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368. 
 203. See Miller, supra note 26, at 306–08. 
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and simplified: instead of looking to evidence of intent, courts look 
to the potential for fraud. Courts are also likely to be more suited 
for analyzing the potential for fraud than for determining 
testamentary intent, thus fulfilling the channeling function more 
effectively than the other curative doctrines.  
Maintaining the Guezuraga test achieves the goals of the 
curative doctrines and requires no change in the law. The doctrine 
adequately serves the four functions of testamentary formalities. 
The protective function is best served by courts looking to the 
likelihood of fraud in the testament’s formalities. The channeling 
function is more effective than in substantial compliance or 
harmless error: courts are better equipped to make determinations 
of fraud rather than conduct analyses of testamentary functions, 
thereby streamlining the judicial process. The cautionary and 
evidentiary functions are unaffected by the Guezuraga test because 
the formalities themselves remain unchanged. Certainly, this 
approach is both equitable and practical. Moreover, the doctrine is 
entirely unique in United States succession law, providing 
Louisiana courts an opportunity to implement an entirely new 
curative doctrine that may well prove to be far more successful 
than those employed by other states. 
However, the Guezuraga test, as currently applied by Louisiana 
courts, appears to be more comparable to strict compliance.204 
Accordingly, courts should utilize a functional framework as 
opposed to a quantitative standard. Instead of asking whether a 
deviation is “material” or establishing rules through precedent to 
determine the validity of a document, courts must look instead to see 
if a will’s formalities, taken as a whole, adequately guarded the 
testator against the prospect of fraud. This must be done on a 
contextual, case-by-case basis. Certainly, the more insignificant the 
formal deviation is, the greater the likelihood the testament’s 
formalities protected the testator from fraud. On the other hand, if 
the deviation is great, the more likely it is that the testament is 
fraudulent.205  
B. The Advantages of the Guezuraga Test 
A question remains as to whether the Guezuraga test should 
analyze each formal deviation against the occurrence of actual 
                                                                                                             
 204. For discussion of Guezuraga’s inconsistent applications, see supra Part 
III. 
 205. See, e.g., Succession of Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d 56, 59 (La. Ct. App. 1996). 
Succession of Bilyeu appears to be the closest that a court has come to applying 
the standard advocated by this Comment. 
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fraud or, alternatively, the likelihood of fraud. The purpose of the 
protective function, the function best served by the Guezuraga test, 
is to ensure that the contents and execution of the will are the 
products of the testator’s free choice.206 Requiring evidence of 
actual fraud places a strong burden on the challenger to the 
testament and also undermines the purposes of the formalities. For 
example, every time a testator’s signature is omitted from the 
testament, the only means of invalidating the will would be to 
produce evidence that the signature was missing due to actual 
fraud or undue influence, thus negating the effectiveness of the 
signature requirement. The testator cannot be adequately protected 
under this standard. Furthermore, the Court in Guezuraga 
supported analyzing each document against the mere probability of 
fraud: “If [the deviations] indicate an increased likelihood that 
fraud may have been perpetrated they would be considered 
substantial and thus a cause to nullify the will.”207 By looking to 
the likelihood of fraud, the functions of the formalities are 
protected and the Guezuraga test remains a relaxed and contextual 
standard.  
At first glance, the likelihood-of-fraud standard might appear 
to be quantitative; a missing signature of the testator will almost 
always carry with it the probability of fraud or undue influence. 
Nevertheless, likelihood of fraud does not necessarily create a 
blanket rule akin to strict compliance. If other evidence indicates 
that the lack of a signature was not the product of fraud and that 
the document accurately reflected the intent of the testator, the 
testament can still be validated. However, some Louisiana courts 
have precluded the introduction of testimony or affidavits of the 
notary or witnesses to “cure” an attestation clause that does not 
comport with the statutory requirements.208 Excluding such 
                                                                                                             
 206. Shipp, supra note 11, at 725. 
 207. Guezuraga, 512 So. 2d at 368 (citing Loretta Garvey Whyte, Note, 
Donations—Imperfect Compliance With the Formal Requirements of the 
Statutory Will, 15 LOY. L. REV. 362, 371 (1969)). See also Bilyeu, 681 So. 2d at 
59 (“If there exists an indication of the increased likelihood of fraud, the 
variations would be considered substantial and thus a cause to nullify a will. If 
not, they should be disregarded.”).  
 208. See, e.g., Succession of English, 508 So. 2d 631, 633 (La. Ct. App. 
1987) (“The affidavit used to probate the will cannot ‘cure’ the total lack of an 
attestation clause. Such an interpretation would render meaningless the 
mandatory requirements of the statute and do violence to the jurisprudentially 
recognized purpose of the attestation clause.”); In re Succession of Richardson, 
934 So. 2d 749, 752 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (“We further conclude that, unfair as it 
seems, there is no procedure that would allow the witnesses to testify as to the 
validity of the will.”); In re Succession of Holbrook, 115 So. 3d 1184, 1189 (La. 
Ct. App. 2013) (“Although Mrs. Holbrook attempted to remedy this defect in the 
540 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
evidence is inequitable and inconsistent with Guezuraga and should 
not be followed. To disregard the testimony of the notary or 
witnesses renders their roles in the execution ceremony somewhat 
useless considering one of the purposes of testamentary formalities 
is to serve an evidentiary function.209 Consequently, Louisiana 
courts should abandon the rule that some courts have utilized that 
precludes admission of witness testimony or affidavits in support of 
a will invalidated for lack of compliance with all form requirements.  
C. The Guezuraga Test in Application 
To provide an example of the proposed analysis in practice, 
consider the facts of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent holding 
in In re Succession of Holbrook.210 The will was properly signed 
and witnessed by the appropriate parties.211 On the attestation 
clause of Mr. Holbrook’s will, the notary neglected to place the 
day, the 8th, next to the month and year, April 2009.212 Standing 
alone, with no other statutory deviations, the omission provides little 
evidence that the testament was likely the product of fraud or undue 
influence. The date would be relevant if the opponent of the will 
sought to introduce another testament written in the same month and 
year as the contested will. Here, though, the only document 
available for probate was the disputed will.213 Furthermore, the 
proponent of the will’s validity, the decedent’s widow, attempted to 
introduce affidavits supplying the testimony of the notary and one of 
the witnesses to demonstrate that the will had been properly 
executed.214 Moreover, every other page on the document 
contained the full date.215 Such evidence, combined with the minor 
nature of the defect, would indicate the likelihood of fraud to be 
                                                                                                             
 
attestation clause by submitting affidavits stating that Mr. Holbrook executed his 
will before the notary and two witnesses on April 8, 2009, and that the ‘8’ in the 
date of the attestation clause was inadvertently omitted, additional evidence on 
this issue is precluded.”), rev’d, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014); In re Succession of 
Seal, No. 2010-CA-0351, 2010 WL 3527597, at *4 (La. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 
2010) (“Further, such defects constitute a substantive defect fatal to the validity 
of the will and cannot be cured through the subsequent testimony of the 
witnesses and the notary.”).  
 209. Glover, supra note 14, at 23.  
 210. In re Succession of Holbrook, 144 So. 3d 845 (La. 2014). 
 211. Id. at 846–47. 
 212. Id. at 848. 
 213. The court makes no mention of an alternative testament. Id.  
 214. Id. at 847. 
 215. Id. at 848. 
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minimal in Mr. Holbrook’s case. Hence, under the Guezuraga test, 
a court would likely validate the will under such circumstances.  
CONCLUSION 
The struggle that Louisiana courts face with respect to will 
formalities transcends many jurisdictions throughout the United 
States. The effort to reform the law of will execution as a means to 
protect testamentary intent has been laudable, albeit flawed. This 
area of the law is still evolving; until courts apply one of the 
remedial doctrines with success, uncertainty will continue. This 
Comment contends that courts and scholars should recognize a 
new approach: the Guezuraga test. If the document, with all formal 
requirements and evidence taken into consideration, reflects that 
the testator was adequately protected against the likelihood of 
fraud, the will should be considered valid. If the formal deviation 
increases the probability that the document is fraudulent, the will is 
null. By applying a likelihood-of-fraud analysis, Louisiana courts 
have the opportunity to pioneer in this area of the law by validating 
formally defective wills with logic and consistency through a 
unique approach utilized by no other jurisdiction in this country. 
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